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Family Law. Allard v. Allard, 708 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1998). A disabil-
ity pension is subject to equitable distribution in a divorce proceed-
ing to the extent that it represents the spouse's vested retirement
pay earned during the marriage.
In Allard v. Allard,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that a firefighter's disability pension is subject to equitable
distribution in a divorce proceeding, despite this court's previous
holding in Thompson u. Thompson2 and the apparent protection
afforded to such pensions under Rhode Island General Laws sec-
tion 9-26-5.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Albert R. Allard (Albert) and Camille E. Allard (Camille) were
married on November 11, 1972.3 Approximately two years later,
Albert was hired by the Woonsocket Fire Department as a
firefighter/rescue worker.4 The marriage produced three children,
all of whom were still minors when the parties were granted a final
divorce in June of 1991.5
According to the provisions of the final judgment, "Albert was
to pay Camille one-half the present value of his retirement pension
evaluated as of March 15, 1991," the date the Family Court
granted the parties an absolute divorce on the ground of irreconcil-
able differences. 6 Albert's pension plan was valued at $167,098,
half that sum, or $83,549, was the amount Camille was entitled to
under the final judgment.7
Albert assigned to Camille his interest in the marital domicile
in a consent decree dated May 18, 1994, as partial payment of the
amount owed from the retirement pension under the decree.8 Ac-
cording to the decree, Albert's interest in the marital home
amounted to $35,500.9 The consent decree also provided that the
1. 708 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1998).
2. 642 A.2d 1160 (R.I. 1994).
3. See Allard, 708 A.2d at 555.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id. According to the final agreement, this sum was to come from his share
of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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City of Woonsocket would pay Camille twenty-nine percent of Al-
bert's monthly pension payments until the balance was paid off.'0
On July 29, 1994, just months before Albert was to become eli-
gible to apply for a twenty-year-retirement pension, he suffered a
job-related injury.1 ' Six months later, Woonsocket's mayor
granted Albert's request for a disability-retirement pension.12
Albert moved to modify the final judgment of divorce on April
11, 1995, arguing that a disability pension plan, unlike a retire-
ment pension plan, is not subject to equitable distribution. 13 Addi-
tionally, Albert sought a reimbursement of $35,500, his interest in
the marital domicile which was conveyed to Camille pursuant to
the consent decree, since that interest was conveyed in place of her
receiving funds under the retirement plan.14
The family court entered a decision on September 7, 1995,
finding that Camille was entitled to fifty percent of the value of
Albert's pension, reduced by the $35,500 she received pursuant to
the consent decree. 15 Albert objected to the entry of the decision,
which the family court later rejected. Thereafter, on February 12,
1996, the order was entered by the family court.' 6 Albert filed a
timely appeal with the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The issue on appeal, according to the court, "[was] whether a
disability pension is subject to equitable distribution to the extent
that it represents an employed spouse's vested retirement pay
10. See id. The payments by the city to Camille were to begin when Albert
began receiving the proceeds of his pension plan upon retirement. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. According to the court,
[had Albert retired without a disability in January 1995, he would have
received a pension equal to sixty percent of his weekly pay, and Camille
would have been entitled to receive one-half of that weekly sum until the
balance owed to her pursuant to the consent decree was paid. By qualify-
ing for a disability-retirement pension, Albert took payments equal to 66
2/3 percent of his weekly salary, or $52.15 per week more than what he
would have received in straight retirement pay. The disability payments
received by Albert may enjoy certain tax advantages.
Id. at 556.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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earned during the marriage."' 8 Albert argues that his disability
pension is not subject to equitable distribution based upon the
court's prior holding in Thompson v. Thompson. Thus, according
to Albert, the trial justice erred in awarding Camille any portion of
his disability pension. 19
The court differentiated the facts of the present case from
those in Thompson.20 In Thompson the court addressed the dis-
tinction between a contributory retirement pension and a "'true'
disability pension." 21 The primary difference between the two
types of pensions concerns their status pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws section 15-5-16.1.22 Under section 15-5-16.1, a con-
tributory retirement pension plan is subject to equitable distribu-
tion, whereas a "true" disability pension is not.23
In Thompson, like here, the issue was whether the husband's
municipal disability pension was a marital asset subject to equita-
ble distribution. 24 In that case, the husband suffered a back injury
and was forced to retire after ten years of service. 25 Subsequently,
while the couple remained married, the money from the pension
18. Id. at 555.
19. See Allard, 708 A.2d at 556.
20. See id.
21. Id. (citing Thompson, 642 A.2d at 1164).
22. See id.
23. See id. Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16.1 provides in pertinent
part:
Assignment of property.-(a) In addition to or in lieu of an order to pay
spousal support made pursuant to a complaint for divorce, the court may
assign to either the husband of wife a portion of the estate of the other.
(b) The court may not assign property or an interest therein held in
the name of one of the parties if the property was held by the party prior
to the marriage, but may assign income which has been derived therefrom
during the term of the marriage, and the court may assign the apprecia-
tion of value from the date of the marriage of property or an interest
therein which was held in the name of one party prior to the marriage
which increased in value as a result of the efforts of either spouse during
the marriage. The court also shall not assign property or an interest
therein which has been transferred to one of the parties by inheritance
before, during, or after the term of the marriage. The court shall not as-
sign property or an interest therein which has been transferred to one of
the parties by gift from a third party before, during, or after the term of
the marriage.
Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (1956) (1996 Reenactment)).
24. See Thompson, 642 A.2d at 1163.
25. See id.
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was used to pay household expenses and to increase the marital
assets. 26 The Thompson court, noting a jurisdictional split on
whether such pensions are marital assets, decided that "a disabil-
ity pension is not a marital asset and is therefore not subject to
equitable distribution."27
The court refused to extend the holding in Thompson to cover
the pension acquired by Albert after his divorce from Camille, even
though, technically, both were disability pensions. In doing so, the
court based it's reasoning on two factors; the function of the disa-
bility pension, and various policy considerations. 28
First, the court noted that Albert had the option of selecting
payment under two different pensions.29 Even after his injury,
both pensions served substantially the same function: to provide
for Albert and his family throughout retirement.30 The disability
pension would, additionally, compensate Albert for his personal
suffering and lost earning capacity as a result of his injury.3 '
The court also relied on reasons of policy when determining
that Albert's pension was not exempt from equitable distribution,
stating that "one spouse should not be allowed to defeat the other
spouse's interest in an asset earned and accumulated during the
marriage by invoking a condition wholly within his or her con-
trol."3 2 Thus, if Albert's position was adopted, it would be against
the very nature of Rhode Island's equitable distribution statute
due to the fact that family court justices would be precluded from
making fair and just assignments of marital assets based upon the
joint contribution of spouses during the marriage.33
26. See id.
27. Id. at 1163. The court noted that "la] number of courts have held that
disability benefits are a marital asset." Id. (citations omitted). And "[o]ther juris-
dictions have declared disability pensions separate property to be considered by
the court only in awarding alimony and child support." Id. (citations omitted).
The court further noted that courts of other jurisdictions "examine the nature of
the disability benefits and may consider some portion of the payments marital
property." Id. (citations omitted).
28. See id. at 557-59.
29. See id. at 557.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 558.
33. See id.
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The decision in Allard in no way affects the existing doctrine
that compensation for injuries is non-marital property.34 The
supreme court specifically held that "only that portion of [Albert's]
disability pension attributable to his retirement pay is marital
property subject to equitable distribution."3 5 Therefore, compensa-
tion for pain and suffering, future lost wages, future medical ex-
penses, and loss of earning capacity, are the injured spouse's
separate property. 36
Albert's final argument on appeal concerns Rhode Island Gen-
eral Law section 9-26-5. 37 Albert contends that this section pre-
cludes Camille from being awarded any portion of his pension
because it is statutorily exempt from attachment. 38 The court dis-
missed this argument, stating that the statute in question "is
designed to protect funds from creditors and not from the families
of employees."3 9
CONCLUSION
In Allard v. Allard, the Rhode Island Supreme Court limited
its previous holding in Thompson v. Thompson to "pure" disability
pensions. The pension at issue in Allard, according to the court,
was more than a mere disability pension, since it also constituted a
spouse's retirement pension. Therefore, to the extent that the dis-
ability pension represented the spouse's vested retirement pay ac-
cumulated during the marriage, that pension is subject to
equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding.
Christopher E. Friel
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. (citing Kirk v. Kirk, 557 A.2d 976, 978-79 (R.I. 1990)).
37. See id. at 559 n.4. The relevant portion of section 9-26-5 states:
No interest of any person in any pension fund or in any pension derivable
therefrom, for the benefit of police officers or firefighters... by any city or
town ... to which fund the city or town contributes ... shall be subject to
trustee process or liable to attachment on any writ, original, mesne, or
judicial, or be taken on execution or any process, legal or equitable; and no
assignment of any such interest shall be valid.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-26-5 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
38. See id.
39. Id. (citing Duke v. Duke, 675 A.2d 822, 823 (R.I. 1996)).
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Family Law. Beauvais v. Luther, 705 A.2d 975 (R.I. 1998).
Where an action to establish paternity is brought within the stat-
ute of limitations set forth in Rhode Island General Laws section
15-8-6, a separate action brought to enforce the father's obligations
of support may be brought in the same or other proceeding, as long
as the enforcement action is brought within six years of the com-
mencement of the paternity suit.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 9, 1981, Danielle N. Beauvais (Danielle) was
born to Linda Beauvais (Linda).1 Prior to her pregnancy, Linda
was intimately involved with Wayne S. Luther (Wayne).2 Accord-
ing to Linda, she and Wayne continued their sexual relationship
until April of 1981; the affair ended when Linda became pregnant
and Wayne moved out of their apartment.3 On December 24, 1991,
ten years after Danielle's birth, Linda instituted paternity proceed-
ings against Wayne in the Family Court.4 The suit was filed by
Linda, acting as Danielle's next friend, and by the State of Rhode
Island, Department of Human Services (DHS).5 In addition to the
establishment of paternity, Linda sought past and future child
support payments, while DHS sought reimbursement for past sup-
port paid to Danielle by the agency.6
Upon receiving the complaint and summons in January of
1992, Wayne sent a letter to the Bureau of Family Support, as well
as a copy of that letter to the Family Court.7 The letter, in which
Wayne denied paternity but did not request a jury trial, was en-
tered by the Family Court as his answer to the complaint.8 Four-
teen months later, Wayne filed a formal answer through his
attorney.9 A request for a jury trial was made at that time, but the
request was denied. 10
1. See Beauvais v. Luther, 705 A.2d 975 (R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 977.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 976.
5. See id.
6. See id,
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id,
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Wayne's first defense was that both DHS and Linda were
barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws section 15-8-6 from seeking monies for past support."
Wayne also filed a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative de-
fense of laches. 12 The motion to dismiss was denied in an interloc-
utory decision on September 26, 1994.13 At this time, the master
also concluded that DHS's action for reimbursement was not
barred by the statute of limitations. 14 Subsequently, a hearing
was conducted in the late summer and early fall of 1994.15 Wayne
was adjudicated to be the natural father of Danielle, and was or-
dered to pay child support of one hundred dollars a week, from the
commencement of the action. 18 Wayne was also ordered to reim-
burse DHS for its past payments of support to Danielle. 17
Wayne appealed the decision of the master to the Family
Court pursuant to rule 53A(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Domes-
tic Relations.' 8 The family court concluded that 1) the evidence
established that Wayne was Danielle's father, and Danielle was
therefore entitled to support, 2) Wayne failed to request a jury trial
in a timely manner, and 3) that the statute of limitations barred
DHS from seeking reimbursement for sums paid to Danielle by the
agency.' 9 Thereafter, both Wayne and DHS filed appeals to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. 20
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island General Laws section 15-8-6 provides the statute
of limitations for an action to determine the paternity of a child.
Prior to its amendment in 1996, the statute read:
An action to determine the existence of the father and child
relationship as to a child who has no presumed father under
section 15-8-3 may not be brought later than four (4) years
after the birth of the child. However, an action brought by or
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 977.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
on behalf of a child whose paternity has not been determined
is not barred until four (4) years after the child reaches the
age of majority.21
The amendment simplified the applicable statute of limitations by
providing that no paternity action was barred until four years after
the child reached the age of majority.22 In Beauvais, the court was
asked to clarify the application of the statute, prior to its amend-
ment. The statutory interpretation of the statute of limitations for
a paternity action is particularly important because under the Uni-
form Law on Paternity, the statute of limitations for an enforce-
ment proceeding against the father is related to the timely filing of
a paternity suit.23
ANALysis AND HOLDING
Finding of Paternity
Wayne's first argument to the supreme court was that there
was not sufficient evidence to prove he was Danielle's father. 24
During the course of the initial hearing, Wayne disputed Linda's
testimony regarding the time span of their relationship. Although
Linda claimed to be in a sexual relationship with Wayne until
April of 1981, Wayne maintained that sexual relations between the
couple ceased after November of 1980.25 Finding Linda's testi-
mony to be more believable than Wayne's, the master adopted her
version of events. 26 In addition, three blood or tissue typing tests
were entered into evidence, all of which concluded that the
probability of paternity was a minimum of 98.46%.27 These blood
tests were conducted with the assumption that there was a 50%
prior probability of paternity.28 The third test, performed at
Wayne's request, produced the highest probability of parentage at
99.99%.29
21. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-8-6 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. To satisfy the burden of proof, the plaintiff must prove paternity by
clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 15-8-8.
25. See Beauvais, 705 A.2d at 977. Wayne also claimed to have moved out of
the apartment on January 31, 1981. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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On appeal, Wayne claimed that he successfully rebutted any
evidence tending to prove he was Danielle's father.30 Specifically,
Wayne argued that because it was not proved he was sexually in-
volved with Linda at the time Danielle was conceived, the prior
probability of his paternity was 0% rather than 50%.31 However,
the supreme court noted the master believed Linda's testimony
that the couple had been sexually involved when Danielle was con-
ceived, which supported the method used to calculate probability of
paternity.32 This finding was accepted by the family court justice,
and the supreme court refused to disturb those findings "absent a
showing that the family court justice was clearly wrong or other-
wise overlooked or misconceived evidence."33 Thus the court con-
cluded there was sufficient evidence that Wayne was Danielle's
father, and thus he was obligated to pay prospective support for
Danielle's benefit.3 4
Denial of a Jury Trial
Wayne argued that he was wrongfully denied a jury trial be-
cause such a request was made in the formal answer filed by his
attorney, and that answer related back to the first answer of Janu-
ary 21, 1992.35 The court noted that, under Rhode Island General
Laws section 15-8-8.1, a jury trial must be requested within ten
days of the answer's filing.36 The supreme court quickly dismissed
Wayne's argument, stating that "[tihe defendant's analysis of the
interplay between his first answer and that filed by his attorney
over a year later would allow him all the benefits of a timely an-
swer without the concomitant responsibilities."37 The court also
noted that Wayne failed to exercise another option at his disposal
when he failed to file a supplemental motion with the family court
justice for a trial by jury.38
30. See id. at 978.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 979.
36. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-8-8.1 (1956) (1996 Reenactment). The right to a jury
trial in a paternity suit has since been removed; trial shall be by the court. See
Beauvais, 705 A.2d at 979 n.6.
37. Beauvais, 705 A.2d. at 980.
38. See id.
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The Statute of Limitations and Reimbursement of DHS
In reversing the order that Wayne reimburse DHS for the sup-
port payments made to Danielle before paternity was established,
the family court interpreted three provisions of the Uniform Law
on Paternity. Section 15-8-4 limits the time frame in which a fa-
ther is liable for "past education and necessary support and main-
tenance are limited to a period of six (6) years" following the
institution of an action under the provision of the Uniform Law on
Paternity.3 9 Section 15-8-6 provides the statute of limitations on
an action brought to determine the existence of a father and child
relationship. 40 The statute provides that "an action brought by or
on behalf of a child whose paternity has not been determined is not
barred until four (4) years after the child reaches the age of major-
ity."41 Finally, Rhode Island General Laws section 15-8-19 pro-
vides for the enforcement of judgments against a father where
paternity is declared.42
The family court concluded that the enforcement provision
necessarily "presuppose[s]" that a paternity claim has been
brought within the statute of limitations by the person or entity
charged with the support and maintenance of the child. 43 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court found this interpretation of the stat-
utes to create "unnecessary conflict" between the provision gov-
erning the statute of limitations for a paternity action and the
statute of limitations for support obligations. 44 The court instead
found that the 1996 amendment to section 15-8-6 "clearly indicates
that this section was never intended to limit the remedies of those
who have provided past support to a child."45 As long as the pater-
39. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-8-4 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
40. See id. § 15-8-6.
41. Id.
42. The text of section 15-8-19 of the Rhode Island General Laws reads:
15-8-19. Judgments-Enforcement.
If existence of the father and child relationship is declared ... the
obligation of the father may be enforced in the same or other proceedings
by the mother, the child, the public authority that has furnished or may
furnish the reasonable expenses of... support... or by other persons,
including a private agency, to the extent that they furnished or are fur-
nishing those expenses.
Id.
43. Beauvais, 705 A.2d 979.
44. See id.
45. Id.
1999]
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nity suit is filed within the statute of limitations delineated in sec-
tion 15-8-6, a person or agency who has provided support to the
child may seek enforcement of the father's support obligations
within the six year statute of limitations provided for in section 15-
8-4.4 Therefore, DHS was entitled to seek reimbursement from
Wayne once the father and child relationship between Wayne and
Danielle was established.47 Accordingly, the court remanded the
issue of reimbursement to the family court in order to establish the
amount of repayment to which DHS was entitled.48
CONCLUSION
In Beauvais v. Luther, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
asked to clarify the statute of limitations for enforcement actions
following the determination of a child's paternity. The holding of
the case reflects the plain wording of the relevant portions of the
Uniform Law on Paternity. However, the holding also reflects
principles of fairness in allowing those who enabled the support of
a child to be repaid that support once paternity is established. It is
now clear that an action brought to enforce a father's obligation to
his child may be filed either within six years or in the same suit in
which the paternity action is filed.
Sarah K Heaslip
46. See id. (citing Turner v. Mosca, 703 A.2d 1114 (R.I. 1997)).
47. See id.
48. See id.
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Family Law. Koziol v. Koziol, 720 A.2d 230 (R.I. 1998). A final
decree of divorce may be issued by the family court although other
issues, such as alimony, child support, and property settlements
remain on appeal pending final judgment. A final decree of divorce
must be stayed only when the divorce itself is appealed.
In Koziol v. Koziol,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court formally
adopted the dictum of Centazzo v. Centazzo,2 which stated that
Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate, Procedure3 grants
a family court justice the authority to issue a final decree of divorce
where necessary for the protection of the parties pending an appeal
on other matters.4 The supreme court in Koziol reasoned that
where a party is not appealing the decree of divorce itself, delaying
the final decree of divorce is unnecessary where it may be detri-
mental to either party.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Michael J. Koziol (Michael) and Mary J. Koziol (Mary) were
married on July 22, 1978.6 At that time, Michael was employed as
an accountant, and Mary was employed as a second-grade teacher
and reading specialist.7 Michael and Mary had two children, and
Mary took a one-year leave of absence from her employment after
each birth.8 Mary also assumed the majority of homemaking and
child care duties during the course of the marriage.9 In 1989,
Michael made a career change, accepting an administrative posi-
tion at Memorial Hospital in South Bend, Indiana. 10 At the same
time, Mary gave up her eleven-year teaching career." Michael
stayed in this position for three years, after which he accepted a
position as Vice President of Financial Operations at Rhode Island
1. 720 A.2d 230 (R.I. 1998).
2. 556 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1989).
3. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. App. P. 7.
4. Koziol, 720 A.2d at 232 (citing Centazzo, 556 A.2d at 563).
5. Id. at 232-33.
6. See id. at 231.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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Hospital. 12 Michael and Mary moved to Rhode Island, purchasing
a home for approximately $350,000.13
In 1993, Michael entered an executive MBA program, which
was paid for by the joint savings of the couple in addition to a
$15,000 inheritance that Mary received. 14 One year later, Michael
lost his position at Rhode Island Hospital.' 5 He received a sever-
ance package of one year's salary plus bonuses.'1 In April of 1995,
Michael began a new position as the Chief Financial Officer of the
Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary, with a salary of $124,000
per year.' 7
In September of 1995, Michael filed for divorce.'1 After a trial
ending in February of 1997, the family court awarded joint custody
of the children with physical possession to Mary.19 Mary was also
awarded child support in the amount of $1,800 per month and ali-
mony in the amount of $2,500 per month, with the alimony to be
reduced over the next ten years. 20 The family court also distrib-
uted the marital assets according to an appraisal of the marital
domicile provided by Mary's expert.21
Michael filed an appeal of this decision on April 21, 1997.22
On September 4, 1997, the family court incorporated the previous
decision, entering its decision pending entry of final judgment. 23
On September 5, 1997, Michael appealed this decision, and on Sep-
tember 9, 1997 moved to enter the final judgment of divorce. 24
Michael then filed a clarification of notice of appeal on September
24, 1997, stating that he was only appealing the awards of child
support, alimony and distribution of marital assets. 25 Five days
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 231-32.
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later, the family court entered a final judgment of divorce, includ-
ing the awards of alimony, child support and asset distribution. 26
Mary's first argument challenging Michael's appeal claimed
that if Michael was challenging the final judgement of divorce, he
was barred from doing so because no appeal may be made from an
entry of final judgment.27 Mary's second argument claimed that if
Michael was appealing the interlocutory decision and the decision
pending entry of final judgment, his appeals were moot in light of
the final judgment incorporating those terms. 28
BACKGROUND
In Centazzo v. Centazzo, the Rhode Island Supreme Court con-
sidered, in dicta, whether it is proper for a family court justice to
enter a final judgment of divorce while the parties are appealing
other issues contained in the decision.29 The court explained that
although family court proceedings are generally stayed pending
the outcome of an appeal, Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules of
Appellate Procedure3 ° allows a family court justice to issue orders
necessary to protect the parties pending the outcome of the
appeal. 3 '
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Koziol court first noted that Michael's appeal of the April
3, 1997 interlocutory decision, and his appeal of the September 4,
1997 decision pending final entry of judgment, were timely filed. 32
In Rhode Island, a party may appeal an award of child custody,
child support, and assignment of the marital estate from an inter-
locutory decision pending final entry of judgment.33 In addition,
the court noted that Rhode Island General Laws section 14-1-52(a)
26. See id. at 232.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 562-64 (citing Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1989)).
30. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. App. P. 7.
31. See Koziol, 720 A.2d at 232 (citing Centazzo, 556 A.2d at 563).
32. See id. at 232.
33. See Mattera v. Mattera, 669 A.2d 538 (R.I. 1996); see also Thompson v.
Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160 (R.I. 1994) (appealing the distribution of marital assets
made in an amended interlocutory decision pending entry of final judgment).
1999]
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provides for an appeal of a decision granting a divorce upon entry
of final judgment.3 4
The court then posited the issue in the case: "is a Family Court
justice permitted to enter a final judgment on the divorce while
other issues contained in the decision pending entry of final judg-
ment remain on appeal?"3 5 Turning to the dicta in Centazzo, the
court reiterated that Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, through general language, grants a family court
justice the authority to issue orders necessary to protect the rights
of parties while an appeal is pending.36
Accordingly, the court held that a family court justice may is-
sue a final divorce decree despite the fact that portions of the judg-
ment remain on appeal pending entry of final judgment.3 7 It is
only when the divorce itself is appealed that a final judgment of
divorce must be stayed.3 8 Permitting a family court justice to
enter the final decree of divorce in these circumstances avoids un-
necessary delay and harm to either party where one party appeals
items in the judgment other than the decision for divorce. 39 The
court specifically noted that incorporation of the appealed items in
the final judgment does not bar the appeal for mootness.40
The court further determined that the family court justice did
not act outside his discretion in making the child support award. 41
In particular, the family court justice properly excluded the ali-
mony award when calculating the parties' gross income because
alimony refers to alimony received as a result of a prior marriage,
not alimony awarded in the instant proceedings. 42 Therefore,
Michael's claim that the lower court erred in failing to include pre-
vious alimony payments made to Mary when determining child
support was without merit.
34. R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52(a) (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
35. Koziol, 720 A.2d at 232.
36. Rule 7 of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure
states, in pertinent part, that "[tihe justice or judge of the Superior, Family, or
District Court who entered the judgment, order, decree, or other determination
from which review is being sought . . . may make . . . such other orders as are
needed for the protection of the parties." Id.
37. See Koziol, 720 A.2d at 232.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 232-33.
40. See id. at 233.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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Additionally, the court also found the family court justice did
not abuse his discretion by relying on Mary's expert's valuation of
the marital domicile. 43 The award of 58 percent of the marital es-
tate to Mary was not unreasonable under the circumstances, and
was therefore within the court's discretion." Therefore, the court
upheld the distribution allotted by the family court justice.45
Where the family court justice has taken into account the factors
listed in Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16,46 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court will not disturb the alimony award. 4
7
CONCLUSION
The holding in Koziol reflects a sound and fair approach to the
issuance of a final decree of divorce. Where neither party to the
divorce appeals the judgment of the divorce itself, a final decree of
divorce may be entered although other elements of the judgment
have been appealed. The court's holding avoids any unnecessary
delay in the change of the parties marital relationship, while pre-
serving the right of the parties to challenge any interlocutory deci-
sions made in the course of the divorce proceedings.
Sarah K. Heaslip
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 234.
46. Section 15-5-16(b)(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws provides in perti-
nent part:
In determining the amount of alimony... the court. . . shall consider: the
length of the marriage; the conduct of the parties during the marriage; the
health, age, station, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational
skills, and employability of the parties; and the state and the liabilities
and needs of each of the parties.
Id.
47. See Koziol, 720 A.2d at 234.
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Family Law. Schaffner v. Schaffner, 713 A.2d 1245 (R.I. 1998).
In an action for divorce, a retirement plan voluntarily entered into
in lieu of Social Security benefits is a marital asset subject to equi-
table distribution. Furthermore, where the present value of such a
plan is unascertainable, the preferred formula for dividing the
plan's proceeds is the deferred distribution method.
In Schaffner v. Schaffner,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) pension is subject to equitable distribution in a divorce pro-
ceeding.2 After determining that such a pension is subject to equi-
table distribution, the court then determined that, where the
present value is unascertainable, the proper method for dividing
the pension's proceeds is the deferred distribution method.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
After nearly twenty-five years of marriage, Richard and Janet
Schaffner filed for a divorce. 4 At all time pertinent to the divorce
proceeding, Richard was employed at the Social Security Adminis-
tration.5 Richard had voluntarily chosen to opt out of the Social
Security program, instead participating in the CSRS pension pro-
gram, which was available to federal employees. 6 Janet ceased
working in 1976, and remained at home as primary caretaker of
the couple's only child.7
After a trial on the merits, the trial justice provided for equal
division of all marital assets, excluding the CSRS pension.8 The
trial justice did, however, provide for an equal distribution of Rich-
ard's CSRS benefits when Janet became eligible to receive Social
Security benefits. 9 The court deferred distribution of the CSRS
benefits until Richard actually began receiving them.' 0
1. 713 A.2d 1245 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 1247.
3. See id. at 1250.
4. See id. at 1246.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1247.
7. See id. at 1246.
8. See id. at 1247. Additionally, Janet's request for alimony was denied and
Richard was required to maintain Janet's health insurance policy for two years.
See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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Richard raised two issues in his appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.1 ' First, whether the trial justice's determination
to subject the entire amount of the CSRS benefits to equitable dis-
tribution was in error.12 Second, whether the trial justice erred in
deferring the distribution of his CSRS benefits.' s
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first addressed the nature of
Richard's CSRS pension. 14 Richard claimed that "the trial justice
should have first deducted from the total amount of his CSRS ben-
efits the amount that he would have received in Social Security
benefits had he not decided to opt out of the Social Security Sys-
tem."15 Only then, Richard claimed, should the trial justice have
divided the remaining balance between the parties.16 Richard fur-
ther contended that "his 'hypothetical social security benefits' are
akin to traditional Social Security benefits and that as a result he
should be treated like 'any other citizen of the United States.'"'17
According to the court, Richard's first argument was without
merit. 18 The court concluded that Richard "is being treated like
any other citizen who receives pension benefits."19 The court em-
phasized the fact that Richard voluntarily chose to opt out of the
Social Security System.20 Determining that it was Richard's
"choice and decision to abandon the Social Security program and
its [distribution] exemption. He cannot now reasonably expect this
Court to treat him as part of a group to which he does not
belong...." 21
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id. Under the Federal Social Security Act, payments received as Social
Security benefits are excluded from distribution in a division of marital property.
See id. at 1247 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 407, 659(a), and 662(c)); see also Kirk v.
Kirk, 577 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1990) (stating that Social Security benefits are not subject
to equitable assignment in divorce proceedings).
16. See id. at 1247.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id. The court also stressed that Janet's financial situation was a proper
factor for the trial justice to consider in order to effectuate the goal of an equitable
distribution. See id. at 1247-48.
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Next, the supreme court addressed Richard's second issue on
appeal: whether the trial justice's decision to defer distribution of
the pension benefits was in error.22 Generally, there are three
methods of dividing retirement benefits:
The present value method requires the trial court to de-
termine the present value of the pension and compensate the
non-pensioned spouse with other assets equal to his or her
share in the pension.
The reserve jurisdiction method allows the trial court to
reserve jurisdiction to determine what the non-pensioned
spouse will be entitled to once payment of benefits begins.
Another method of valuation, the deferred distribution
method, permits the trial court to determine the non-pen-
sioned spouse's percentage interest in the pension benefits on
dissolution of the marriage but to defer distribution of that
spouse's share until the pensioned spouse retires. 23
In Rhode Island, the present value method is the preferred ap-
proach to the distribution of pension benefits.24 However, it is not
feasible in every case to award a lump-sum amount.25
The trial court's refusal to utilize the present value method in
this case was proper.28 Even though Richard had sufficient assets
to pay any present value award, he was still undecided about when
he was going to retire. 27 As a result of his indecision, "the monthly
payments Richard was expected to receive upon retirement dif-
fered greatly."28 Therefore, the trial court's decision to defer distri-
bution of the pension assets, "so that an accurate distribution
amount could be calculated," was proper under these
circumstances. 29
22. See id. at 1249.
23. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Marriage of Kelm, 878 P.2d 34, 36
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994)).
24. See id. According to the court, this method "'effects a complete severance
of the spouses' interests and gives each spouse immediate control of his or her
share of the marital property.'" Id. (quoting DuBois v. DuBois, 335 N.W.2d 503,
505 (Minn. 1983)).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1250.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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CONCLUSION
In Schaffner v. Schaffner, the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
fused to extend the equitable distribution exemption afforded to
Social Security benefits to an alternate retirement pension, when
that spouse voluntarily opted out of the protected pension. Fur-
thermore, when the retirement pension's present value cannot be
reasonably ascertained, the preferred method of distribution is the
deferred distribution method.
Michelle Erin Berthiaume
